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99c: Price-Points in E-Commerce: Non – Technical Summary 
 
This paper attempts to shed light on the pricing behaviour of firms or sellers in market places 
with price competition. In particular, it aims at testing the mechanism that lies at the heart of 
one of the most famous models in economics, namely the Bertrand model of competition. 
This model suggests that firms’ profits will be zero as soon as there are at least two sellers in 
the market. The model is built on the idea that consumers will go to the cheapest shop, even if 
the differences in prices are “infinitesimal”. As a result, firms are tempted to undercut their 
opponents’ price by a small amount and they do so over and over until they end up charging 
the cost at which they produce their products.  
 
However, the underlying assumption is at odds with the observation that consumers typically 
do not care very much about a single cent and the predicted outcome clearly goes against the 
fact that many prices end in 99c. If sellers really charged the price at which they buy or 
produce a good or a service, we should observe all possible price endings. Basu (2006) argues 
that the prevalence of 99 cent prices in shops can be explained by rational consumers who 
disregard the rightmost digits of the price. This “bounded rational” behaviour leads to an 
Bertrand equilibrium with positive mark-ups allowing firms to make at least small profits.  
 
We use data from an Austrian price comparison site, which bears the advantage that in such 
an environment other factors than price both can be observed online and play a minor role. 
Price comparison sites are therefore highly suited for our test.  
 
We find results highly compatible with Basu’s theory. We can show that price points - in 
particular prices ending in 9 - are more frequent than other endings and have significant 
impact on consumer demand. This shows that the mechanism that was postulated by Bertrand 
is not in place. Consumers do not necessarily choose the cheapest price and they even less do 
so when the Euro digits of the price are the same (i.e. when the difference is small). 
Moreover, the nine-ending prices are sticky: neither the price-setter itself wants to change 
them nor the rivals do underbid these prices, if they represent the cheapest price on the 
market. This might either show that shops seem to believe that it is no use to only slightly 
undercut a rival’s price if this doesn’t trigger a change in the Euro, or it is an indication that 
there might be some sort of silent agreement to not undercut a price ending in 9. 
 
Our findings shed new light on the behaviour of consumers and firms, and propose that 
theoretical investigations on competitive behaviour should consider “discrete state spaces”, 
i.e. markets where the smallest plausible price change is by a Euro or at least by a full Cent. 
99c: Price-Points in E-Commerce. Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Häufig enden Preise auf 99 Cent oder werden langlebige Konsumgüter wie PCs oder Autos 
mit Preisen ausgezeichnet, die mit 99 oder 999 Euro enden. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit besteht 
darin, diese Beobachtung empirisch zu untersuchen und zu testen, ob sie auch auf 
Onlinemärkten zu finden ist. Dabei sollen jene theoretischen Modelle getestet werden, die 
versuchen eine ökonomische Erklärung für dieses Verhalten zu finden, ohne die Annahmen 
anderer zentraler Modelle der Ökonomie zu verletzen. 
  
Eines der wichtigsten Modelle zur Erklärung des Wettbewerbsverhaltens von Firmen ist das 
Bertrand-Modell. In diesem Modell reagieren Kunden auf minimale Preisänderungen und 
Firmen unterbieten sich gegenseitig, da sie so ihren Marktanteil schlagartig erhöhen können. 
Im Gleichgewicht genügen schon zwei Firmen, damit die Produkte ohne Gewinn verkauft 
werden und es bleiben nur jene Firmen im Markt, die zu diesem Preis liefern können.  
 
Die Annahmen und Vorhersagen dieses Modells würden implizieren, dass Produkte ohne 
Gewinn direkt weiterverkauft werden und dass alle Endungen gleich häufig vorkommen. Vor 
allem wenn die Kund/innen auf jede noch so kleine Preisänderung reagierten, sollte man nicht 
erwarten, dass Preise mit größerer Häufung an der Schwelle von einem Preis mit 9 Euro und 
der nächsten vollen Zehnerstelle auftreten. 
 
Dennoch kann dieses Verhalten beobachtet werden und die Frage stellt sich, worin die 
Erklärung für dieses Phänomen liegt. Solch einen Erklärungsversuch leistet das Modell von 
Basu. In diesem Modell reagieren die Kund/innen nicht mehr auf jeden noch so kleinen 
Preissprung. Stattdessen beachten sie, um beim Vergleichen der Preise Aufwand zu sparen, 
nur die vorderen Stellen eines Preises und nehmen für die letzten (ignorierten) Stellen einfach 
an, dass sie auf 9 enden. Das derart modifizierte Modell gelangt zu einem Gleichgewicht, in 
dem  alle Händler einen (oder denselben?) Preis setzen, der tatsächlich auf 9 endet und der die 
Produktionskosten übersteigt. So können die Anbieter geringe Gewinne erzielen. 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit verfolgt das Ziel, diese Hypothesen mit Daten der Online-
Preisvergleichsseite www.geizhals.at zu testen. Preisvergleichsseiten im Internet, auf denen 
die Händler nach ihrem Preis sortiert werden, sind einem Markt wie jenem im Bertrandmodell 
sehr ähnlich, sodass sie ein gutes Testfeld darstellen. Mit den Daten von über 20.000 
Produkten und 820.000 Angebotspreisen wird untersucht, ob Preise häufiger auf 9 enden und 
ob Angebote mit der Preisendung 9 häufiger nachgefragt werden und als Angebote mit 
anderen Preisendungen. Außerdem wird analysiert, ob Online-Shops solche Preise länger 
beibehalten bzw. ob Mitbewerber/innen einen „Neunerpreis“ zögerlicher unterbieten als runde 
Preise (z.B.: €500) oder andere Preise. Dabei wurde mit der Methode der 
Instrumentenvariablen und der Ereigniszeitanalyse gearbeitet. 
 
Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen deutlich, dass Preise häufiger auf 9 enden und dass Online-
Shops solche Preise länger beibehalten als Preise mit anderen Endungen. Darüber hinaus kann 
erstmals gezeigt werden, dass die Konkurrenz den Preisführer eines Produktes zögerlicher 
unterbietet, wenn dieser einen „Neunerpreis“ gewählt hat.  
 
Insgesamt sind diese Ergebnisse im Einklang mit dem Modell von Basu. Die Ergebnisse legen 
nahe, dass gewisse Aspekte der Standardmodelle mit anderen Annahmen modelliert werden 
sollten. Vor allem sollte dem Umstand Rechnung getragen werden, dass üblicherweise nur 
diskrete Preisschritte wahrgenommen werden.  
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Abstract
Basu (2006) argues that the prevalence of 99 cent prices in shops can
be explained with rational consumers who disregard the rightmost digits
of the price. This bounded rational behaviour leads to a Bertrand equi-
librium with positive markups. We use data from an Austrian price com-
parison site and find results highly compatible with Basu’s theory. We
can show that price points - in particular prices ending in 9 - are preva-
lent and have significant impact on consumer demand. Moreover, these
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the role of price points in consumers’ purchasing decisions
and sellers’ price setting behavior of e-commerce markets. Price Points are
defined as values with special price endings that are frequently used, i.e. the
prevalence of 0-ending (also referred to as "even prices") and 9-ending prices
("just-below prices" or "odd prices"). While previous explanations for this
phenomenon rely on costumer’s perceptions of these price points - i.e. 9-ending
prices convey a particular image of a product (image effect) - Basu (2006)
explains such price-setting as a rational strategy of oligopolists in a retail
market: If - due to information-processing difficulties - consumers disregard
the right-most digits of the price; it might be rational for firms to set prices
with a 99-ending in equilibrium. By doing so, firms can increase their prices
somewhat and escape the zero profit forecast of the Bertrand equilibrium in a
retail market (level effect).
Whereas previous research analyzes these price points in offline-markets (scan-
ner data from supermarkets, real estate markets) we focus on online-markets.
The lack of studies in emerging e-commerce markets is surprising given that
the digital revolution might change our understanding of the firm pricing pro-
cess. One might argue that the lack of comprehensive studies in online markets
can be explained with less pronounced problems of price comparison: less cog-
nitive difficulties to memorize and compare products of different retailers. In
particular, at a price comparison site all price offers for a specific product can
be seen at one mouse-click. On the other hand, we still observe price obfusca-
tion (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000) - e. g. by variation in shipping cost - and
service differentiation between e-tailers so that the idea of strictly ascending
price listings looses importance. We will show that - although less than in
brick-and-mortar stores - we do see a considerable proportion of odd as well
as even prices in online shopping.
Most of the studies in offline markets analyze very specific issues of price points
either on the demand side in form of field or laboratory experiments or on the
supply side in form of price rigidity analysis. The focus and innovation of
our paper lies in the consistent and comprehensive analysis of both sides of
the online market: on the one hand the analysis of pricing strategies with
price points has to consider price-setting decisions of firms; on the other hand,
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demand regularities on the part of the buyers have to be identified within a
consistent data set. Only if both sides of the market show consistent reactions
correct conclusions on price points can be drawn: If odd (or even) prices turn
out as equilibrium outcomes, they should prevail longer as comparable non-
focal prices. Beyond that, price points should behave consistently in market
equilibrium situations: as we are the first to observe the whole market, we can
look at price stickiness for prices set by random firms, but also at prices for
price-leaders. Basu’s (2006) model predicts: if a market equilibrium results in
focal prices ending in 99 cent, other firms might be less willing to undercut
this price point.
We use comprehensive data from Austria’s largest price comparison site to test
theories on price points. While most previous studies consider only buying
intentions, small samples and a limited number of products, our data has the
advantage that we can observe the entire market place with all competing
shops. We use price information on 24473 products posted by 714 sellers
together with information about referral clicks and last-click-throughs which
are typically used as demand indicators in e-tailing.
We show that 99-ending prices - in general focal prices - are prevalent in a
market environment where they should least be expected to be. Our results are
highly supportive of Basu’s theory: consumers disregard cent in their shopping
behavior, prices are more stable if they end with 9. Moreover, best-prices
ending in 9 or 99 are not changed by the price-setting firms and are less likely
to be underbid by the rivals of the shop.
2 Literature
2.1 Theories for price points
Researchers have focused mainly on two consumer-oriented explanations for
the phenomenon of focal prices1 (Stiving and Winer, 1997):
1There is a wealth of operational or ad-hoc explanations. The most famous example is
the anecdotal account (Stiving and Winer, 1997) of shop-owners, who posted prices which
would force the clerks to give back some small change in order to force their staff to register
the transactions rather than pocket the money. Among other ad-hoc theories Monroe (1973)
mentions (and refutes) views that the number 9 might be considered a magical number with
special properties. Clustering has also been considered as a tool to maintain tacit collusion
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(i) The first approach has been called level effect, left digit effect or left to right
processing (Thomas and Morwitz (2007), Basu (2006) or Thomas and Morwitz
(2005)). The basic idea is the assumption that consumers use a heuristic to
calculate, compare and memorize prizes, due to their limited brain-capacity
to process prices exactly: they read prices from the left and, in particular,
they disregard cent prices. As a result of this boundedly rational behavior,
the consumers tend to overestimate the gap between prices differing only by a
small amount, if the lower price has a smaller left digit (e.g.: e3.00 vs. e2.99).
This theory has only recently been formalized in a Bertrand-Equilibrium model
(Basu, 2006). The paper assumes boundedly rational consumers, who do not
bother to take into account what’s after the comma. Instead, they "guess"
that it is the average of all the last digits of products on the market. This
setting is used to analyze the market equilibria in a Bertrand-setting where
firms can post prices but cannot affect quantities.
The model is relevant for two reasons: Firstly, the mechanism attacks the
Bertrand-paradox: Since consumers ignore the cent ending, undercutting a 9-
ending price by less than a full euro does not generate additional turnover; on
the other hand, it reduces the profit margin. As a consequence, firms who want
to undercut will undercut by a full euro; undercutting with small amounts does
not make sense. Secondly, Basu’s model generates an equilibrium in 99-prices,
that is perfectly rational on the part of the firms and results in positive profits
for the competing firms.
Given this theoretical equilibrium we predict prices that end in 9 to be main-
tained longer than any other price-endings. Furthermore, even though theory
would not predict price-endings different from 99 in equilibrium2 it predicts
similar demand for such items as long as they are priced with the same euro
digit.
A different explanation for the level effect is mentioned already by Monroe
(1973). The hypothesis postulates that consumers, when they plan to pur-
chase an item, have already formed an expectation of the price they are going
to pay, a so-called target price.3 If such a target price is memorized with
as has been shown in Christie and Schultz (1994) and Christie et al. (1994).
2Basu (2006), establishes an equilibrium in 99 cent prices; a further result shows the
existence of two equilibria, one with 99 cent, the other with marginal cost.
3In a similar version of the story consumers might have binding budget set, because they
have only one or two cash bills with them and while a price just below this threshold lies
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an even number, it would typically be beneficial to set prices below these
even-numbered thresholds. As this explanation is usually seen observationally
equivalent to the boundedly rational behavior we do not discriminate between
the two explanations any longer.
(ii) The other important consumer-based approach is called image effect (Stiv-
ing and Winer (1997), Thomas and Morwitz (2007) or Schindler (1991)): Price
setters may use the pattern of a price to transmit specific information about
the item that is being offered. An example could be a clothing company that
uses 00c endings in regular times and 99 endings for items on sale. If this was
true and a 9-ending communicated a good bargain, we would also expect price
clustering, higher demand and maybe some rigidity on 9-ending prices. Yet,
not all the prices are predicted to end in 9 and a similar pattern might emerge
for prices ending in 0 (or any other special number), if a zero were to transmit
positive properties such as product quality.4
It should be noted that the ’image effect’ theories predict higher demand at
focal prices, whereas the ’level effect’ predicts that consumers do not react to
differences in the cent digits with their demand behavior. Moreover, ’image
effects’ might be prevalent not only in 99-ending prices, but also in even prices.
In terms of price stability Basu (2006) predicts that 99-ending prices are more
stable; in particular they should not be underbid by the rivals. There is no clear
prediction for the equilibrium on part of the ’image effect’ theory, because shop
behavior is not explicitly modeled: image prices could be less stable, because
rivals might want to destroy the image of a cheap price by simply underbidding
it; on the other hand, they might be more stable if the additional demand at
the image price is so high, that changes are not worthwhile.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
Concerning demand effects of focal prices, there is a large experimental liter-
ature - starting already in 1936 by Ginzberg (1936) - but only a few studies
look at real markets and actual demand on a larger scale. In one larger study
on single products Stiving and Winer (1997) use scanner data on yoghurt and
tuna and find a large and generally positive relationship between a 9-ending
within their budget set, a price just above doesn’t.
4See also Palmon et al. (2004) for a survey.
5
price and sales. Moreover, they find, that consumers don’t process prices holis-
tically. The field experiments by Schindler and Kibarian (1996) and Anderson
and Simester (2003) observe demand for items in a mail-order catalogue, where
prices were manipulated to show 9-endings. Generally, these experiments find
an overall positive effect on demand. Yet, the significance of the effect depends
on a variety of other factors, such as how much information was available on
a product and whether the item has been introduced only recently. Labora-
tory experiments, in general, have to rely on purchase intentions instead of
actual demand. An example of such an experiment is Gendall et al. (1997),
suggesting that 9-ending prices affect purchase intentions positively.5
Studies looking at price rigidity are very rare.6 Levy et al. (2007) find evidence
that prices ending in nines are sticky in the sense that price setters are more
reluctant to change them. Once these price is changed, though, the ultimate
price jump is larger which might be due to a larger adjustment need. Sehity
et al. (2005) were using the introduction of the euro showing that retailers
all across Europe quickly converged to focal prices again, which had been
overturned on the first of January, 2002.
Only a few studies are able to differentiate between level-effects (left-digit ef-
fect) or image effects. The aforementioned study by Stiving and Winer (1997)
found, that consumers treat the pre-, and post-comma digits in a different
manner. However, apart from this study, the evidence on the image-effect
stems from lab experiments and surveys. In an intention-to-purchase experi-
ment Liang and Kanetkar (2006) obtain similar results as Stiving and Winer
(1997). However, both studies report that even pricing plays a role as well,
which they tend to take as evidence for image effects. Using experimental ev-
idence from Italian consumers Guido and Peluso (2004) find evidence for even
target prices. Moreover, when analyzing how prices are memorized, they find
that consumers recall odd prices smaller than they really are, especially when
the leftmost digit is manipulated in the experiment.7 Thomas and Morwitz
5Liang and Kanetkar (2006) provide an extensive review of the existing literature on price
endings and discuss also the literature on numerical processing and memory-effects of odd
prices; Kauffman and Lee (2005) review issues of price rigidity in e-commerce in general.
6Macroeconomists look at price points or reference prices when they inquire the existence
or prevalence of nominal price rigidities; e.g. Eichenbaum et al. (2008), Levy et al. (2007)
or Konieczny and Rumler (2006). 9-ending prices can act as price points and might in such
a way contribute to price stickiness in general.
7See also Guéguen and Legoherel (2004).
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(2005) finally conclude that the scale of level effects depends on which digit to
the left is affected, which is an indication that left-digit-effects play a role.
Specific evidence for image effects is provided by Naipaul and Parsa (2001),
who compare restaurant menus and find that menu-makers use even prices
to suggest higher quality and just-below prices to indicate bargains. This is
largely in line with the ideas in the work of Schindler (1991).
3 Data and prevalence of price points
For our empirical analysis we use the database of http://www.geizhals.at. This
web site is a price search engine collecting the price offers via standardized
protocols from retailers and presents them electronically via its web-platform.
Due to the broad Austrian market penetration of Geizhals.at, this price search
engine practically covers the whole Austrian online market including suppliers
from other countries (especially Germany) which are interested in the Austrian
e-commerce business.
We use an inflow sample of all price spells starting in an arbitrary week in
20078. A price spell is defined as the offer from a specific firm j for a specific
good i at a specific price pij. Each spell has a starting and ending time so
that we can exactly measure the spell durations in seconds. Price spells end
because firms change their price or stop offering the product. Additionally
we know for each and every price spell the respective referral requests from
customers. Referral requests are customer clicks on the firm’s product offer
at the Geizhals.at web page resulting in a forward from the web site of the
price search engine to the online shop of an e-tailer. We normalize the referral
requests to clicks per day to cope with the different offer durations. As very
cheap products are not expected to be bought online due to relatively high
shipping cost we keep only those product offers with an average price larger
than e25. Purchases below that threshold are atypical in e-commerce and
unlikely to occur outside bundles. In total we have 818,483 price spells for 714
e-tailers and 24473 products. On average we measure 25.5 referral requests
per day and product. A more detailed description of our dataset can be found
in Table 1.
8Monday, June 4, 2007, 03:00:00 to Monday, June 11, 2007, 03:00:00.
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Due to the multi-faceted structure of the data we have control variables at
three different levels (descriptives on the variables of interest can be found in
Table 1: (i) E-tailer specific variables - being constant for the product offers
of a specific web-shop j - are the (a) country of origin, (b) a dummy variable,
indicating whether the firm disposes of a pick up facility for customers who
want to avoid the cost and time it takes to ship an item. (c) Finally, we
observe all quality reviews of previous customers. They consist of a free text
section and a standardized grading scheme (five grade scale: 1 . . . best, 5 . . .
worst). We use this information to construct the average grade as a variable
that captures perceived service quality of shops. (d) Moreover, we can control
for the number of customers’ evaluations.
(ii) Furthermore, we have information on three product specific controls: (a)
The number of competing shops measures how many shops were active in the
market i and is thus a measure of competition. (b) activity in the market:
We generated this variable by counting the number of price changes that were
observed during the week of observation to control for the general turbulence
in the market i. (c) a quality indicator for the product. Customers have the
possibility to recommend the product on the Geizhals.at website for purchase
or not. Out of these valuations we know the percentage of positive recommen-
dations for the product.
(iii) Apart from price, referral clicks and the timestamps (begin and end)
of a price spell, we observe the following offer-specific (ij) information: (a)
shipping cost and (b) time until the product is can be shipped. If some control
variables (mostly availability, shipping-cost and pick-up facility and product
reviews) were not available, we imputed those variables at the mean and used
imputed variables together with a missing flag for imputations.
Even though referral clicks are available in the data, the actual act of purchas-
ing a product is unknown, because actual purchases happen at the e-tailer’s
own web site. This is unobservable for Geizhals.at and thus for us. Therefore,
following Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) and Bai (2004), we use the concept of
last-click-through (LCT) as a proxy for the purchasing decision. If a customer
is searching for a product, she might meander around different web sites, com-
paring characteristics of the shops, but she will finally settle for the preferred
shop and buy there online. The last click to a shop selling the product is
usually identified as the click with the highest purchase probability. We con-
8
struct the LCT from the referral clicks using a procedure which is based on
hierarchical clustering and Grubbs’ test for outlier detection.9
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of price-endings to check for the
prevalence of price points. The four graphs depict the distribution of price
endings in different samples of interest: (a) all prices, (b) offers that were
clicked at least once, (c) price-leading offers and (d) best-selling offers (defined
as most frequently clicked offers with a market share greater than 10%)10.
Note that in any of the four samples odd and even prices are more frequent
and that even prices are even more so. Given that we observe 100 different
cent-endings, a uniform distribution would imply a frequency of 1 percent of
the observations for each digit. Clearly the 00c, 99c, 90c, and 50c-ending are
more frequent than other price endings. This pattern is even more pronounced,
when we restrict our attention to price-leading or best-selling offers. Almost
4% of the price-leading offers (fourfold the expected frequency) were quoted in
99c and another 4% were quoted in 90c. Taken together, the four focal price
endings make up more than 40% of the bestselling price-endings.
Prices ending at even euro might be more relevant for expensive products. A
closer look at the 00 cent digits reveals that these prices are not necessarily
typical ’even prices’. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the unit position
for prices ending with 00 cent. The four graphs show the same four groups
of interest we used above. It turns out that in all groups a cumulation of
prices ending in 9 can be observed - and as before, the pattern is even more
pronounced for the clicked and best-selling offers. E.g. in the sample of best-
price offers 40 percent of offers end with nine euro, zero cent.
4 Price points and consumer behavior
Our demand estimation in Table 2 looks at consumers’ clicks (qij) on the
‘Geizhals’-website. A consumer click is a referral request to retailer j for
product i.
9In practice, the construction of the last-click-through (LCT) is a lengthy procedure
because a time span for observation as well a product span has to be chosen. See Dulleck
et al. (2008) for details. Here, we define LCTs on the product level where a time interval of
one week initiates a new search period. Additional results when using other definitions of
LCT are available upon request.
10Market share was defined as the number of referral requests for offer ij relative to the
total number on clicks on product j.
9
qij = a0 + bDij + a1rel. priceij + cXij + a2iproducti + ij
As the duration of the price offers varies, we standardize consumer clicks as the
number of clicks per week. The vector Dij includes various dummy variables
for price points, like odd or even prices. We use two different definitions for
price points:
In the first definition we use the most frequent price points as dummy variables:
cent prices ending in 99c (e0.99), 90c (e0.90) and 50c (e0.50). For prices with
zero cent we distinguish those with a nine before the comma (e9.00) from those
with other digits (e¬9.00) because the former should be considered as 9-ending
prices.
To convey the flavor of odd and even prices we use a second - more encompass-
ing - definition. We set the dummy 9-clustered to 1 if the price is either ending
with 9 neglecting the rightmost zeros (e. g. e576.90, e39.00, e590.00) or has
at least one nine in the last four digits including the cent (e.g. e91.81, e899.11,
e59.92). The dummy evenprice(without9) takes the value 1 whenever a price’s
ending is 00 cent without a nine being present in the four rightmost digits (e.
g. e345.00, e100.00). This definition for 9-clustered prices is broader and
covers also prices which at first sight might not be considered as focal prices;
the advantage of the definition is that it is a general one and not ad-hoc.
Finally, to test directly Basu (2006) we artificially split up the price into its
euro digits (multiplied by 100) and the remaining cent digits. Fully rational
consumers should pay the same attention to changes in the euro or the cent
digits, provided they have the same amount; the coefficients for the two vari-
ables should be equal and negative. Basu (2006) on the other hand, argues
that consumers do not consider the cent digits in their demand, its coefficient
should be zero therefore.
The variable rel. price measures the price of product i of retailer j relative to
the average price of product i over all retailers (hence rel. priceij =
pij∑N
j=1 pij/N
).
Additional control variables in vector X include: rel. shipping cost which
are calculated from the information given at Geizhals.at. Germany is equal
to 1 if the online shop is located in Germany, Austria otherwise. Avail is
equal to 1 if the product is deliverable at short notice. Evaluation − grade
measures the service and reliability evaluation of a shop j by the costumers
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in a scale between 1 and 5 (very good to very bad). #Evaluations counts
the number of customers who have given an evaluation of the retailers’ service
characteristics. Pickup is equal to 1 if the retailer has a pick up store. As we
are merging markets for different products, we include product fixed effects in
the estimation. We are using price offers for a week in June 2007. As prices
may be valid for a varying number of days, we calculate a standardized number
of clicks per day as our dependent variable qij.
Price setting might be endogenous to demand. Therefore, we instrument the
relative price of the product by the mean relative price a firm has in all markets
except in markets where the products belong to the same subsubcategory as the
product in question11. In the first stage regression, the instrument has a strong
and significant impact on prices resulting in a marginal R2 of 0.093. Moreover,
setting a low price in a different market should not influence demand in our
market; thus the exclusion restriction will hold. The exclusion restriction is
particularly convincing, because customers in a price-comparison site cannot
look at the complete price list for all products in the other subsubcategories
of one particular firm. As the organization of the web-site allows only price
comparisons for one particular product across firms, consumers have a very
hard time to get an image of the overall pricing behavior of one particular
firm.
Table 2 looks at the influence of price points on demand using customer clicks.
columns (1) to (3) of Table 2 use all referral requests as demand indicators,
whereas columns (4) to (6) employ only last-click-throughs (LCTs) which are
considered as better indications for real purchasing decisions. Both indicators
for demand give fairly similar results: as expected, those on last-click-throughs
are numerically considerably smaller.
There is no clear indication that the usage of price points (column 1) boosts
demand. Prices ending with 99 cent are unremarkable. Whereas prices ending
with 90 or 50 cent attract less clicks, those ending with zero cent - in particular
those ending with 9 euro - attract more clicks. Regression results for the last-
click-throughs in column (4) confirm this picture, albeit on a lower scale. This
pattern is generally affirmed using our definitions for odd and even prices in
11Geizhals.at maps products hierachically into subsubcategories, subcategories and cat-
egories describing the substitutional relationship between the products. As an example,
the category ‘Video/Photo/TV’ contains the subcategory ‘TV sets’ and the subsubcategory
‘30-39 inch LCD TV sets ’. In total 358 subsubcategories and 40 subcategories are given.
11
column (2): we receive somewhat higher demand for 9-clustered price endings,
but no effects for even prices not containing nines. The relatively small effect
of 9-clustered prices vanishes once we introduce last-click-throughs in column
(5).
Finally, our test for left-to-right processing: Contrary to a fully rational con-
sumer our shoppers behave only boundedly rational. The euro part of the
price has a strong negative effect on demand, whereas the effect of the cent
is either positive for the number of clicks or zero for LCTs. This is a direct
affirmation of Basu’s (2006) hypothesis of consumers disregarding the cent.
For more expensive products not only cent but also unit digits should be ir-
relevant for the consumer decision. For products with prices above e100 we
repeated this exercise, but shifted one digit to the left: a price of e234.67
results so in a ’significant variable’ with a value of 23.000 and an ’insignificant
variable’ with value 0.467. Again, rational consumers should show the same
coefficients for both variables. For all clicks we find coefficients of -0.028***
(0.002) for the first and 0.376***(0.081) for the second variable, for LCTs we
find -0.002*** (0.0002) and 0.034***(0.010). These patterns with the non-
negative signs for the ’insignificant variable’ strongly confirm Basu’s bounded
rationality hypothesis.
Our further control variables meet our expectations from online markets: The
relative price of the shop decreases demand.12 The positive influence of higher
shipping cost on market demand can be seen as evidence for obfuscation
strategies, where online shops compensate their lower prices with higher extra
charges. 13
E-tailers with immediately available offers and better and more customer eval-
uations attract more customers. The positive sign of the Germany dummy
points out that the Austrian price search engine is increasingly used by the
German market14.
12This effect is not statistically significant in the LCT model, which might be due to the
instrumentation strategy. The corresponding OLS coefficients for the relative price are both
significant and somewhat higher than the ones presented in Table 2.
13Hossain and Morgan (2006) show that buyers are inattentive to shipping costs in eBay
auctions as well.
14In November 2008 72 percent of the online shops are located in Germany and 62 percent
of the clicks are from German IP-addresses.
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5 Price rigidity and firm behavior
In this section we analyze the relationship between price endings and the du-
ration of price-quotes. If 99-ending prices are an equilibrium maximizing firms
have a low inducement to change these price points. On the other hand, if
a price ending is non-focal e-tailers should have an incentive to switch to a
nearby price point to increase demand. Hence, price point theory predicts
that shops maintain offers at price points significantly longer than non-focal
prices.
We use duration analysis to compare the survival time of offers with price
points to the other offers’ survival time. At first, we look at individual firm
behavior as it is measured by the time span that elapses until a firm changes
its own price. We model the hazard of ending an individual spell at duration
t using a semi-parametric Cox model which allows for a fully flexible baseline
hazard hj0(t) and adds other variables proportionally:
h(t|j,Dij, θij, xi) = hj0(t)exp(δDij + βxi + γθij)
j is the firm index and i is the product-index. The variables of interest are
the indicators for the respective price endings e0.99, e0.90, e0.50, e9.00,
e¬9.00, 9-clustered, and evenprice(without9). Additionally, we add controls
at the offer-level and the product-level15: θij are four offer-specific controls,
which include shipping cost, availability, clicks and price. xi captures three
product-invariant characteristics such as number of competing shops, activity
in the market in form of the number of price changes and an indicator for
recommendations of the product by consumers.16
5.1 Pooled analysis
We first present in Table 3 (column 1-3) results from a pooled analysis where
the baseline hazard hj0(t) is assumed to be equal for all firms. (i.e.: hj0(t) =
h0(t)∀ j). Standard errors are clustered at the product level. The base regres-
sion in column (1) uses no additional control variables and thus corresponds to
15Since we later stratify with respect to shops there is no need to add shop-specific controls.
16Kauffman and Lee (2005) discuss hypotheses about price rigidity in e-tailing relating
to market concentration, product quality and size of the market. Kashyap (1995) gives a
comprehensive overview of price stickiness in retail (catalogs).
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estimating simple Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for the five different price
points e0.99, e0.90, e0.50, e9.00, and e¬9.00. All offers with price points
have a lower hazard; i.e. they last longer. The effect is strongest for the odd
price endings e9.00 followed by e¬9.00 and e0.99. We see the lowest impact
for e0.50. A Coefficient of -0.762 for e9.00 corresponds to a reduction of
53.32% in the hazard rate. Likewise, a coefficient of -0.238 for the 50c dummy
translates to a reduction of 21.18%. When a non-focal price ending has a 50%
chance of surviving 54 hours, an offer that is priced in 50c has a 58%-chance
to make it to the same point in time. A 90c-offer’s odds to survive 54 hours
or more are 72%.
When adding control variables in column (2) we see our results basically un-
changed: both the numerical values as well as the ranking of coefficients for
our price points are fairly stable. Although there are no strict theoretical pre-
dictions for our control variables the coefficients fit into a reasonable picture:
More expensive articles and offers with higher shipping cost tend to have longer
offers. The fact that offers for products which are immediately available hold
longer is consistent with an obfuscation strategy: e-tailers which do not have
the product in stock might use short-run bargain offers in order to attract
the customers’ attention. At a later point in time - when the product can be
delivered immediately - they switch to a higher price. The more clicks an offer
generates the lower is the incentive to change the price. The same applies for a
low number of average price changes from all other firms on the market, which
is an indicator for the market’s intensity of competition.
Column (3) uses the alternative specification of price points. Again, price
points have significant and substantial longer durations than other prices: here,
the highest effect is for even price (without 9), with a somewhat smaller effect
for the 9-clustered dummy.
5.2 Stratified analysis
It might be that particular shops have specific pricing strategies: e.g. one shop
is changing prices routinely each week, another firm might change them every
day. In order to deal with these differences, we use a stratified analysis, which
is allowing for a firm-specific baseline hazard rate. Our identification of the
effect of price points stems now only from within-firm variation in the duration
14
of price offers. As in any fixed-effects model we would expect lower coefficients
in this stratified analysis.
In columns (4-6) of Table 3 we report results from the stratified estimation,
again including product-specific clustered error terms. While, as expected, our
numerical coefficients are smaller as compared to the pooled analysis, all the
previous patterns are reinforced. Focal prices have a longer average duration
and the effect is strongest for prices ending in e9.00 and even price (without
9) prices. Again, the weakest effect is found for price quotes ending in 50c.
This stratified analysis shows that our price point effects cannot be explained
by firm-specific pricing policies: even one and the same shop keeps offers with
price points longer than other comparable offers.
6 Price rigidity for price leaders
Up to now we looked at the stability of any price offers. To investigate market
outcomes or equilibrium outcomes, the equilibrium price should be studied. As
there is still price dispersion in online markets we take the offer with the lowest
price: the “price-leading” offer. We thus draw a sub-sample of offers, which
held the lowest price at one point in time. The time a price-leading offer is
valid can be cut in different ways: either another firm is actively undercutting
this price or the price-leading firm itself is discontinuing the offer by going out
of the market or charging a higher price. For an analysis of the competitive
actions in such a market, undercutting by rivals is the decisive feature. Basu
(2006) would argue that an equilibrium at 99-cent prices would not be undercut
by a rival because it is not profitable to do so.
The new sample consists of 41574 offers and 14928 incidents, where a price-
leading offer was undercut by an opponent. Our analysis uses a competing risk
Cox model stratified by firm level in order to allow for two outcomes: under-
bidding or own price changes. Table 4 shows the results. columns (1-3) show
top-offers, which ended by undercutting while columns (4-6) show top offers
that were changed by the price-leader itself. We use the same specifications
as in Table 3. Our main interest is in the undercutting part. Focal prices are
less likely to be undercut, the strongest effect is for prices ending in e9.00
and e0.99 (columns 1 and 2), effects for even prices are smaller (e¬9.00) or
insignificant (e0.50). When we use our alternative specification (column 3) we
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see a similar pattern: a strong effect for odd prices, but no significant effect
for even prices (evenprice(without9)). The results for own changes in columns
(4) to (6) are less clear: only prices ending in 90 cent live longer before they
are withdrawn by the firms.
Controls in Table 4 show basically a consistent picture: The higher the number
of clicks while in lead the higher is the probability that the offer is undercut
by a competitor. The more active a market is - measured with the number
of price changes of all other firms - the shorter are the best-price price spells.
In markets with a higher number of competing shops we observe that shops
change their prices more frequently.
7 Interpretation and conclusions
In this paper we present the first comprehensive and consistent analysis of
price points on the supply and demand side of a market. We analyze the is-
sue in the context of e-commerce, an environment that is, a priori, not very
favorable to price points. Our results are consistent with Basu (2006) who
assumes boundedly rational shoppers ignoring the rightmost digits due to lim-
ited processing capacity. Profit-maximizing firms will adapt by setting prices
ending in 9s. We find that market demand does not react to differences in
the cent digits, as Basu (2006) is assuming. Moreover, odd prices show typical
equilibrium characteristics: they are more sticky than regular or even prices.
This is particularly so for best-price offers: when these offers end with 9, they
are less likely to be undercut by the rivals, they are also less often changed by
the firm itself.
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8 Tables and Graphs
Figure 1: Distribution of the cent digits on www.geizhals.at
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Figure 2: Distribution of the last euro digits of 00c-ending offers on www.geizhals.at
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Table 2: Demand and Focal Pricing
clicks per week last-click-throughs per week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
e0.99 0.097 -0.020
(0.121) (0.016)
e0.90 -0.276*** -0.018*
(0.082) (0.011)
e0.50 -0.614*** -0.050***
(0.094) (0.012)
e9.00 0.510*** 0.065***
(0.119) (0.016)
e¬9.00 0.266*** 0.023***
(0.061) (0.008)
9-clustered 0.087** 0.006
(0.037) (0.005)
even price (without 9) 0.058 0.005
(0.057) (0.008)
euro digits in 100s -0.307*** -0.021***
(0.018) (0.002)
cent digits 0.131** 0.003
(0.052) (0.007)
relative price -1.516*** -1.585*** -0.051 -0.055
(0.425) (0.424) (0.056) (0.056)
rel. shipping cost 0.180*** 0.200*** 0.180*** 0.017** 0.019*** 0.017**
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
immmediate 1.683*** 1.664*** 1.691*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.151***
availability (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
reviews -0.105*** -0.113*** -0.104*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012***
grade (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
reviews 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
number (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
German shop 0.249*** 0.259*** 0.241*** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.015**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
constant 1.696*** 1.706*** 1.364*** 0.069 0.068 0.103***
(0.445) (0.444) (0.120) (0.059) (0.058) (0.016)
Observations 817553 817553 817553 817553 817553 817553
No. Products 23430 23430 23430 23430 23430 23430
Log L -3336965 -1678960
χ2(DF ) 7634 (13) 7542 (10) .(9) 3055 (13) 3009 (10) .(9)
Notes: columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) show IV-Panel-regressions, columns (3) and (6) simple Panel-regressions. Dependent
variable in column (1)-(3): clicks per week , dependant variable in column (4)-(6): last-click-throughs per week. Standard errors
in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 No. Obs. = 817,553; No. firms = 628; No. products = 23,430
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Table 3: Focal Prices and Price Stickiness: All price offers
pooled stratified
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
e0.99 -0.438*** -0.307*** -0.107*** -0.061***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
e0.90 -0.408*** -0.371*** -0.098*** -0.087***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
e0.50 -0.238*** -0.172*** -0.054*** -0.035***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
e9.00 -0.762*** -0.532*** -0.194*** -0.131***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
e¬9.00 -0.443*** -0.374*** -0.132*** -0.102***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
9-clustered -0.140*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.003)
even price (without 9) -0.334*** -0.054***
(0.005) (0.006)
price in 100s -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
relative shipping cost -0.085*** -0.066*** -0.006 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
immediate -0.167*** -0.174*** 0.044*** 0.044***
availability (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
clicks -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
number of shops 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
price changes 0.452*** 0.458*** 0.425*** 0.425***
excl. own change (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
recommendations 0.016 0.012 0.026** 0.026**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 803368 803368 803368 803368 803368 803368
Failures 775735 775735 775735 775735 775735 775735
Log L -9670155 -9619230 -9623473 -5917888 -5881645 -5881801
χ2(DF ) 13814 (5) 30824 (14) 22610 (11) 642.0 (5) 10291(14) 9664(11)
Notes: Cox hazard model with cluster-robust standard errors. Dependent Variable: duration. Number of e-tailers
j=703; number of products i=23,498. Number of different offers ij= 409,937; number of failures = 775,735. Standard
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Focal Prices and Price Stickiness: Top-offers
risk: undercut own change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
e0.99 -0.219*** -0.235*** 0.000 -0.003
(0.050) (0.051) (0.054) (0.055)
e0.90 -0.114** -0.098** -0.150*** -0.144***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.040) (0.041)
e0.50 -0.085 -0.088 0.005 0.002
(0.063) (0.064) (0.046) (0.047)
e9.00 -0.336*** -0.311*** -0.058 -0.061
(0.055) (0.055) (0.044) (0.044)
e¬9.00 -0.130*** -0.134*** 0.014 0.004
(0.044) (0.045) (0.035) (0.035)
9-clustered -0.089*** -0.032**
(0.025) (0.014)
even price (without 9) -0.070* 0.008
(0.037) (0.027)
price in 100s -0.002 -0.002 0.001** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
relative shipping cost 0.005 0.004 -0.099*** -0.100***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.020) (0.020)
immediate 0.033 0.027 0.008 0.006
availability (0.041) (0.041) (0.023) (0.023)
clicks while 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.015***
in lead (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
number of shops 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
price changes 2.475*** 2.485*** 3.376*** 3.376***
(excl. own changes) (0.375) (0.376) (0.449) (0.449)
recommendations 0.141** 0.136** -0.013 -0.013
(0.058) (0.058) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 41574 41574 41574 41574 41574 41574
Failures 14928 14928 14928 26632 26632 26632
Log L -79812 -79206 -79223 -150883 -150690 -150694
χ2(DF ) 50.64 (5) 618.7 (13) 574.1 (10) 17.37 (5) 254.9 (13) 236.3 (10)
Notes: Competing risk Cox hazard model with cluster-robust standard errors, stratified at the firm level. Dependent
variable: duration top. Observations: 41,574; failures in the group of undercut (actively changed) offers: 14,928 (26,632;
and 14 offers which were valid more than 43 days)); Number of firms j in estimation = 522; Number of products i=13,471;
Number of different offers ij = 21,759. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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